I've always been a believer that numbers don't lie. They can be misinterpreted, rationalized, argued or downplayed but at the end of the day cold hard numbers are usually a good indicator as to whether or not you are delivering the goods as promised.
Today, I'd like to look at the numbers in Afghanistan.
This is a country in which we "won" between late 2001 and early 2002. And, almost 8 years into it we're still fighting. We still don't have control of the countryside (the reverse has happened) and there is quite literally, no foreseeable end to the conflict.
As a Canadian, my fellow countrymen are also serving in Afghanistan and have been ever since NATO went in. While not nearly as large a contingent as the U.S, German or British presence....we've got just over 2,000 troops in country at any given time... Canadian troops have nonetheless been present in most major offensives and combat operations in the heart of "Taliban" country..... which nowadays is most of the map.
So without further ado, I'd like to present the numbers on Afghanistan for the principal contributor, the United States. I'd like to know what your opinions are, because these numbers surprised me quite a bit.
Funding for U.S Combat Operations in Afghanistan, 2002: 20.8 Billion
Funding for U.S Combat Operations in Afghanistan, 2009 (thus far): 60.2 Billion
Total funds for U.S Combat Operations in Afghanistan, 2002-2009: 228.2 Billion
Funds spent since 2001 on Afghan Reconstruction: 38 Billion
Percentage of U.S funding in Afghanistan that has gone to military purposes: Approximately 90%
Estimated U.S funds needed to support and maintain the Afghan army over the next decade: 4 Billion per year (40 billion)
Afghan Gross National Product: 23 Billion, about 3 Billion of which is from Opium production
Cost of a single Pentagon contract to Dyncorp and Fluor for construction and support of U.S military bases in Afghanistan: 15 Billion
Number of American Troops killed in Afghanistan in 2001: 12
Number of American Troops killed in Afghanistan in 2009 (as of Sept. 7th): 186
Number of non-U.S NATO/Coalition troops killed in Afghanistan in 2009 (as of Sept 7th): 125
U.S Troop Levels in Afghanistan in 2002: 5,200
Expected U.S Troop Levels in Afghanistan by December 2009: 68,000
Number of U.S prisons and holding centers in Afghanistan: 36, with approximately 15,000 detainees
Number of U.S bases (includes all base types such as forward operating posts): at least 74 in Northern Afghanistan alone, total number in country not available
Estimated cost per soldier of maintaining U.S Forces in Afghanistan when compared to Iraq: 30% higher
Number of gallons of fuel per day used by U.S Marines in Afghanistan: 800,000
Cost of a single gallon of gas delivered to the war zone: 100 dollars per gallon
Number of gallons of fuel used to keep Marine tents cool in the summer and warm in the winter: 448,000
Percentage of U.S spy planes and UAV (unmanned aerial vehicles) devoted to Afghanistan: 66%
Number of Afghan civillian deaths recorded by the U.N January-July 2009: 1,013
Number of Additional NATO Forces U.S General McChrsystal is expected to ask for: 20,000
Optimal number of Afghan National Army troops to be trained by 2012, according to U.S General McChrystal's draft plan: 162,000
Current number of Afghan National Army troops that are trained, equipped, and still in the ranks and present for duty: 39,000
Cost of staging the 2009 Afghan Presidential Election: 500 million
Number of complaints of voting irregularities in 2009 Afghan election: 2,500, 691 of which are described as serious chargers.
Number of private military contractors hired by the Pentagon in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2009: 74,000
Percentage of the Pentagon's force in Afghanistan made up of contractors in March, 2009: 57%
Ranking for the percentage of contractors used by the Pentagon in Afghanistan: Highest in any conflict in U.S history.
Cost of the State Department's 5 year contract with Xe services (formerly Blackwater) to provide security for U.S diplomats in Afghanistan: 210 million
Cost of the State Department's contract with ArmorGroup North America (subsidiary of Wackenhut) to guard U.S embassy in Kabul: 189 million
Number of guards provided by ArmorGroup North America for embassy security: 450
Cost of a kilogram of heroin in Afghanistan: 2,500 dollars
Cost of the same kilogram in Moscow/eastern Europe: 100,000 dollars
Unemployment rate in Afghanistan: 40 % (2008)
Daily wage for Afghan National Police: approximately $ 3.75 per day
Daily wage Taliban pays most of it's fighters: between $ 4 and $ 8 per day
Length of time it usually takes to get a case through the Afghan Government Court- between 3 to 5 years (bribes depending)
Length of time is usually takes to get a case through a Taliban court (without bribes): 1 day
Numer of registerted Afghan refugees still in Iran and Pakistan: 3 million
Number of al-Qaida bases believed to be in Afghanistan today: 0 (all experts/intelligence agencies agree on this)
These are just a few of the numbers. There are many, many more. What this does tell me, personally speaking, is that we're losing plain and simple. The Taliban has an inexhaustable supply of manpower that's easily accessible whereas we must spend a small fortune to put one single set of boots on the ground. Once there, that set of boots has every disadvantage- unforgiving terrain and climate, doesn't speak the language, lack of understanding of the complicated tribal system and culture, defending a corrupt and horribly mismanaged government (current Afghan government looks to be in a tie with much of the south vietnamese government in the early 70's if it were a competition of inefficency and corruption)
Where's it all heading? I honestly can't say. As a sign of the times however, the NATO and U.S forces have increasingly gone to metrics. This is a very bad thing, because it usually means we're losing. When fighting forces start spouting metrics, like the number of bad guys killed per week or the number of enemy bridges destroyed or "high level commanders" killed or captured and so on it belies the fact that no major objectives are being met, or even worse that we have no real high level objectives. It also is a sign of impending doom, because it usually means that we've given up on winning the people over and have instead gone into "kill bad guy mode", with the rationale that once we've wiped out all the bad guys then the nation will be safe and secure enough for us to win people over. But it never works out that way, as the British or Russians experience in Afghanistan indicates.